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Th is article argues that video gaming allows for player-focused (egocentric) moral 
experience that can be distinguished from the other-focused (allocentric) moral 
experience that characterizes literature and fi lm. Specifi cally, a Deweyan perspec-
tive reveals that video games aff ord fi rst-personal rehearsals of moral scenarios 
that parallel how, in real life, individuals mentally rehearse the diff erent courses 
of moral action available to them. Th is functional equivalence is made possible 
because the aesthetics of video games bear unique affi  nities to the human moral 
imagination. However, whereas the moral imagination may be limited in terms of 
the complexity and vividness of its analog imaginings, the ethically notable video 
game may draw on the medium’s digital capacities in order to stage elaborate and 
emotionally compelling ethical rehearsals. Th e article concludes by applying this 
perspective to the ethically notable video game Undertale.
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Introduction
Literature and fi lm are frequently lauded for their allocentric nature. Th e fi ctions carried 
by these media are not centrally about the media user—the reader or the viewer—but 
about other people, whose circumstances may be very diff erent from the media user’s 
own circumstances. Th erefore, literature and fi lm are thought to off er an escape from the 
limiting perspective of the self. For example, philosopher Martha Nussbaum proclaims 
the novel’s capacity to “wrest from our frequently obtuse and blunted imaginations an 
acknowledgment of those who are other than ourselves, both in concrete circumstances 
and even in thought and emotion” (2017, p. 400). Likewise, psychologists Raymond Mar 
and Keith Oatley argue that “engaging in the simulative experiences of fi ction literature 
can facilitate the understanding of others who are diff erent from ourselves and can aug-
ment our capacity for empathy and social inference” (2008, p. 173). 
By contrast to the allocentricity of literature and fi lm, video games may be said to 
off er principally egocentric experience: experience that is of and about the self. Players 
manifest their selves in game worlds through controllable character stand-ins, often 
termed “player characters.” Th e game worlds inhabited by these player characters 
revolve around the player’s agency, such that most meaningful events in these worlds are 
prompted by the player’s progression in completing diffi  cult tasks or defeating power-
ful foes. Commonly evaluating the player’s skill are score counters and in-game reward 
systems, which constitute feedback to the player about their accomplishments. In these 
ways at least, video gaming’s gratifi cations are about players themselves: their stories and 
their accolades. Th e medium centers the user’s own, egocentric experience to the point 
that it has been equated with “an experience of the self” by one prominent video game 
scholar (Perron, 2016, p. 200). In line with this perspective, the philosophers Jon Robson 
and Aaron Meskin (2016) have recently argued that video games present self-involving 
interactive fi ctions (SIIFs) that, as digital props, allow players to imagine themselves 
involved in varied scenarios.1 
Th is article argues that the ethics of video gameplay is notable for being as egocen-
tric as other aspects of video gameplay, and that this should be seen as an experience-
defi ning strength of the medium rather than as a weakness. Th e true ethical potential of 
video gaming may lie in challenging and educating the player’s moral self directly rather 
than in transcending the self in the inner life of another. I begin the article by summarizing 
and extending Robson and Meskin’s (2016) argument that video games are SIIFs. Th en, 
through the lens of John Dewey’s integrated moral and aesthetic philosophy, I explore 
how video games can involve the player’s moral self. I propose that self-involving moral 
deliberation fi nds important parallels in the structure of self-involving video gameplay. 
Th ese parallels allow video games to scaff old the player’s moral imagination, animating it 
with a sense of arresting immediacy and meaningful consequence. I conclude the article 
by applying this perspective to the ethically ambitious role-playing video game Undertale 
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Video games as self-involving interactive fi ctions
Robson and Meskin’s (2016) argument that video games are SIIFs is primarily premised 
on players’ discourses about their in-game actions. Rather than employ a third-person 
vocabulary appropriate to the allocentricity of traditional narrative media (“James Bond 
killed the bad guy, and he made it out alive”), players typically employ a fi rst-person 
vocabulary appropriate to describing their own fi ctional eff orts and accomplishments 
(“I killed the bad guy, and I made it out alive”). Non-player observers of gameplay com-
monly mark the same conviction in their second-person address to players. For example, 
they may ask whether “you,” the player, chose selfl essly to save or selfi shly to sacrifi ce the 
Little Sisters in the fi rst-person shooter Bioshock (developed by 2K Boston/2K Australia, 
released 2007). It seems very unlikely that such self-involving fi ctional discourse, intuitive 
and commonplace as it is, should be shorthand for extrafi ctional claims (e.g., “Did you 
make it the case that the player character in the Bioshock fi ction saved the Little Sisters?”). 
Robson and Meskin delimit this argument to games that contain a substantial amount of 
fi ctional content with which the player can interact. My own discussion in what follows 
will target the ethics and aesthetics of narrative single-player games, but may also prove 
applicable to ethically notable multiplayer games.
Common emotional experiences aff orded by video games likewise indicate that game 
fi ctions centrally involve the player’s self. As game designer and novelist Naomi Alder-
man (2013) has pointed out, “while all art forms can elicit powerful emotions, only games 
can make their audience feel the emotion of agency. A novel can make you feel sad, but 
only a game can make you feel guilty for your actions.” Guilt is a self-conscious emotion 
paradigmatically appropriate to a dyadic transaction whereby I, a feeling moral agent, 
have wronged you, a moral patient. Video games can stage such dyadic transactions and 
induce the guilt appropriate to the moral agent. For example, a player might feel guilty for 
having selfi shly sacrifi ced a Little Sister character in Bioshock in order to gain new abili-
ties. By contrast, guilt is not appropriate to a situation in which I learn about an injustice 
perpetrated by someone other than myself, unless I consider myself to be sharing in the 
off ender’s moral identity, as may be defi ned by ethnicity, family, history, class, vocation, 
etc. Th us, even a young contemporary German citizen might experience guilt in response 
to a fi lm depicting Nazi war crimes because they consider their personal history to be 
intimately tied up with their nation’s history. Traditional narrative media may elicit guilt 
in this and other special cases (e.g., Plantinga, 2009, pp. 68-75), but self-conscious emo-
tion comes easy to a medium that is centrally concerned with its user’s own choices and 
actions (Frome, 2006; Lazzaro, 2004; Perron, 2016).
Of course, the player’s choices and actions could only produce guilt under a repre-
sentational description. One does not feel bad about pressing buttons on a controller, 
or even about pressing some buttons more frequently or forcefully than other buttons. 
Rather, the guilt felt by the player is indexed to the player’s self-initiated fi ctional misdeed; 
it is intelligible only as a player’s response to his or her own agency within the game’s 
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fi ctional world. Other paradigmatic emotional experiences aff orded by video gameplay, 
sometimes termed gameplay emotions (Perron, 2016), are similarly self-conscious: pride in 
one’s (fi ctional) accomplishments, for example, or disappointment in one’s (fi ctional) fail-
ures. Video gaming’s potential to elicit self-conscious emotion is another line of evidence 
that prototypical video games are self-involving interactive fi ctions. 
Video gaming, then, fi ctionalizes experiences of choosing and acting, and of expe-
riencing fi rst-hand the consequences of one’s choices and actions (Robson & Meskin, 
2016). Among the kinds of experience open to such fi ctionalization are social experi-
ences of doing right or wrong by fi ctional characters. Such interactions can provoke 
self-conscious moral emotions, including guilt, and they can make normative descriptors, 
such as “good,” “aff able,” “selfi sh,” and “murderer,” fi ctionally true of a player. In short, such 
interactions can be of and about the player’s own moral agency. Of course, this high-level 
characterization of the ethical potential of video gameplay leaves many questions unan-
swered. How does one get from pixels on a computer or television screen to specifi cally 
moral forms of imaginative experience, and how could such experience be said to involve 
the exploration and education of the player’s moral self? Th e next two sections seek to 
answer these questions in showing that the aesthetics of video gameplay can mediate 
natural processes of self-involving moral deliberation through phenomenal and structural 
isomorphisms between these two domains. By “video gameplay,” I refer to the activity 
of engaging with the rules of a video game, and via that engagement to partake in the 
fi ctional world of that video game. I take this notion to be intuitive enough. By “moral 
deliberation,” I refer to the process of reasoning through and about alternative courses of 
morally relevant action. Th is latter notion is the topic of the next section.
A Deweyan perspective on moral deliberation
Th e nature of moral deliberation has been infl uentially rendered by the 19th- and 20th-
century American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey. Dewey centrally observes that 
moral diffi  culty presents to the experiencer as a felt psychic tension between various 
competing personal and social ends.2 One may feel tense about whether to break a prom-
ise in order to help someone in need, or one may feel torn about whether to stay with or 
leave a romantic partner at a time of mounting crisis. In order to resolve the moral and 
emotional tension, the deliberator may mentally simulate the various courses of action 
open to them in order to fi nd the course that best satisfi es the various concerns involved. 
Crucially, this experience is not cool and abstract, but alive, aff ective, dynamic, and imagi-
natively dramatized; it is “played out” in the mind’s eye. Dewey, with collaborator James H. 
Tuft, writes:
Deliberation is actually an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct. We give way, 
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various steps, we fi nd ourselves in imagination in the presence of the consequences that 
would follow; and as we then like and approve, or dislike and disapprove, these conse-
quences, we fi nd the original impulse or plan good or bad. (1932, p. 303)
Th is process of imaginative deliberation, which Dewey elsewhere labels “dramatic 
rehearsal” (1922, p. 190), seeks in its moral application to encompass the full moral sig-
nifi cance of the various competing courses of action open to the deliberator. “What do I 
desire?” “Who might help or hinder me, and how?” “Which valued principles might I vio-
late?” “What consequences would, or could, my actions bring about?” Such deliberations 
may subjunctivize a dizzying array of concerns, desires, ends, confl icts, and conditionals. 
Finding one’s way may therefore require many imaginative “test runs.” Fesmire summa-
rizes Dewey’s thoughts on the object of such deliberation:
Dealing comprehensively with confl icting tendencies is demanded of all deliberative 
processes. In moral deliberation, an experience is “complete” or “consummated” when we 
deal fruitfully with the whole system of desires pressing for recognition and resolution in 
a problematic situation, such as confl icts of long-range ends and short-range ends-in-view, 
along with pressing needs, desires, and ends of our own and of others, as well as contingent 
events, etc. (1995, p. 570)
To deliberate morally, then, is to deliberate imaginatively and comprehensively. It is to 
apprehend the morally relevant elements in a situation, and then integrate them in a 
unifying commitment to forward-looking action. Th is concretist moral epistemology is an 
essential corrective to abstractive and absolutist alternatives. Moral deliberation seldom 
if ever reduces to the application of an abstract rule to a concrete case; in truth, human 
sociality is far too complex, too riddled with nuance and contradiction, for such an 
approach to describe its practice (Johnson, 2014). As argued by Dewey, “the surrender of 
[the abstractive approach] would lead men to attend more fully to the concrete elements 
entering into the situations in which they have to act” (1984, p. 288). However, Dewey 
is also not blind to the fact that imaginative moral deliberation is not the only game in 
town. We deliberate not when we can, but when we feel that we must, that is, when sedi-
mented social habit does not seem to provide a satisfactory fi t with the pressing moral 
demands of a situation (Dewey, 1922, pp. 196-197). In this way, imaginative deliberation 
diff racts blind impulse into discernible lines of intentional action. It thereby aff ords the 
deliberator moral foresight.
A Deweyan conception of self-involving deliberation is at the very core of modern 
psychological studies of self-involving mental simulation, whether moral or otherwise. 
At the global level, enactive and embodied approaches to cognition, such as proposed 
by Barsalou (2008), stress the simulative character of human mental life. Johnson (1993, 
2014) has analyzed the simulative nature of specifi cally moral cognition. His approach 
takes explicit inspiration from Dewey in describing the “moral imagination” as a form 
of dramatic rehearsal of competing courses of moral agency. Th is perspective, in turn, is 
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supported by recent studies of the mind’s capacity to entertain self-involving counterfac-
tuals in order to inform decision-making (Icard et al., 2018). Th ese studies posit a Deweyan 
deliberative procedure in suggesting that moral deliberators evaluate candidate actions 
from an internal simulation of their context-dependent outcomes. Dewey’s position fur-
ther informs these and other studies in its insistence that the moral imagination operates 
over an experienced qualitative totality that involves the self. 
For Dewey, the synthesizing and actuating imagination poises over the whole of 
human experience—including, pertinently, artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation. It 
is what enables the artist to achieve a unifying balance between the various formal and 
representational elements that may constitute a work of art. Prior to the achievement 
of such a balance, the artist’s appraisal of the unfi nished artwork results, as with moral 
deliberation, in a halting psychic tension. Th e work presents as disharmonious or incom-
plete: “an inclusive qualitative whole not yet articulated” (Dewey, 1980, p. 191). When the 
disordered elements are aesthetically harmonized, whether in actuality or preliminarily 
as “exercised in imagination” (ibid., p. 51), the psychological tension resolves in consum-
mated experience and aesthetic emotion. A similar process of tensional resistance and 
sought-for resolution characterizes aesthetic perception, which aims fi nally to discern a 
“pervading qualitative unity” in the perceived work of art (ibid., p. 192). 
Frequently stressing such fundamental convergences between aesthetic and moral 
imagining, Dewey rejects as facultative ideology the common compartmentalization of 
moral and aesthetic modes of experience. He notes that a sense of the vital importance 
of balanced resolution is common to both the aesthetic and moral domains: “justice 
[…] has a strong ally in the sense of symmetry and proportion” (Dewey & Tuft, 1932, p. 
298). Common discourses on moral “beauty,” “ugliness,” and “balance” lend these claims 
plausibility, as do results from moral psychology indicating primitive conceptual map-
pings between moral and aesthetic domains. Th us, aesthetically pleasing or displeasing 
aspects of acts, persons, and situations exert correlative infl uences on the moral judg-
ments predicated of them (Tsukiura & Cabeza, 2011). But there are deeper affi  nities still. 
In summarizing Dewey’s integrative view, Johnson notes that “the aesthetic is that which 
makes it possible for us to have relatively unifi ed, coherent, meaningful, and consum-
mated experiences. Th erefore, the aesthetic is present and intermingles in what we think 
of as the ‘scientifi c,’ the ‘theoretical,’ and the ‘moral’” (1993, p. 208). Th e point of this 
“intermingling,” in the case of the moral imagination, comes from the Humean observa-
tion that moral meaning and motivation do not ultimately originate in arithmetic reckon-
ings or abstract principles, but instead in emotionally charged appreciations of persons 
and situations as we represent them. As a simple demonstration of this fact, observe your 
emotional response to a novel that engages your moral emotions—say, Cormac McCar-
thy’s Th e Road (2006). By contrast, observe your response to any concise summary of that 
same novel. If you are like most people, the novel will engage your moral thoughts and 




Article: Narrative video game aesthetics and egocentric ethics
presents its themes to the moral imagination through its sustained aesthetic treatment: 
its rich characterization, evocatively elliptical dialogue, and poignant plot developments. 
In the same way, video games may be able to scaff old the player’s moral imagination by 
infusing emotionally charged concepts into abstract moral considerations. Rather than 
consider detachedly whether it would be defensible to sacrifi ce one person in order to 
save fi ve, or whether it is permissible to steal drugs to help a sick family member, players 
make subjectively meaningful decisions and take subjectively consequential actions. Th is 
“execution element” (Schulzke, 2014, p. 252; see also Zagal, 2009) comes to matter morally 
because it is aesthetically realized as imaginative experience. 
Video game aesthetics and egocentric ethics
Th e Deweyan moral imagination simulates the workings of social reality and thereby 
mediates a connection between the deliberator’s past and future social conduct. Video 
games, too, simulate various facets of reality, such as population dynamics, as in SimCity 
(developed by Maxis et al., released 1989), or automotive mechanics, as in Gran Turismo 
(developed by Polys Entertainment/Cyberhead, released 1997). Video games may also 
simulate facets of sociomoral reality (Shaff er et al., 2005). Just as the mind can render lively 
and dynamic representations of moral import to the mind’s eye, so the video game can 
support experiences of moral conduct through its representations, that is, its graphical 
assets and models, prerecorded sounds, artifi cial intelligence, etc. For example, the char-
acters that populate the virtual world of the adventure game Life Is Strange (developed by 
Dontnod Entertainment, released 2015) are ostensibly socially human. Th ey are repre-
sented as having hopes, fears, beliefs, desires, regrets, heartbreaks, and other experiences 
and subjective states that we recognize in ourselves and in others. Moreover, these psy-
chologically realized characters interact. Th ey meet and clash in virtual settings, and often 
with grave social ramifi cations. Such representations of thinking, feeling, and interrelating 
social agents constitute props for the player’s moral imagination.3 Th ese props immerse 
the player in digitally vivifi ed, traversable social environments (Tavinor, 2009, ch. 3). 
Th e imaginative support of game worlds is in many ways similar to the imaginative 
support provided by fi lms to their audiences. Both of these media provide iconic modal 
representations that capture and hold the attention of media users, who are invited 
to entertain the set of fi ctional truths thus depicted. As Currie notes, such works “give 
us, through the talents of their makers, access to imaginings more complex, inventive 
and colourful than we could often hope to construct for ourselves” (1997, p. 53). Films, 
however, cannot normally represent the media user’s own choices and actions. Filmic 
representations instead focalize the experience of other persons—characters—many of 
which are fi ctional. We imaginatively engage these characters in order to understand the 
psychological forces that defi ne and compel them. Th is process may educate us about 
the characters’ social existence, though we cannot ourselves reach into and probe that 
MedieKultur 68
95
Article: Narrative video game aesthetics and egocentric ethics
Jens Kjeldgaard-Christiansen
existence. In video gameplay, by contrast, the dynamic representations are keyed to a 
state machine—the underlying, representation-shuffl  ing game engine—whose interac-
tivity allows the player to partake in the game’s fi ction (Juul, 2005, ch. 4). For example, 
in Life Is Strange we play as Max Caulfi eld, a young American woman whose high school 
experience involves her in matters of love, betrayal, violence, infi delity, and suicidism. It is 
a quintessentially moral experience, one of apprehending social convolution and subtlety 
before committing to action. At one point, Max must decide whether to report a fellow 
student for brandishing a loaded gun at another fellow student. Th at choice might seem 
easy, but the off ending student has familial ties to the school management, and Max 
cannot prove what she saw. Moreover, the off ending student, who has shown himself 
extremely prone to violent outburst, might come after Max if he were to fi nd out that 
she had reported him. Th ese and other considerations are likely to infl uence the player’s 
decision about whether to report the off ender. By staging interactive fi ctions such as that 
of Max’s high school experience, video games may support imaginative “playings out” of 
diff erent courses of intentional action with respect to the same initial conditions. And 
by supporting such moral experimentation, video gaming’s inherent egocentricity aligns 
the medium with the enactive moral imagination. It positions the player as a deliberative 
moral actor rather than as a contemplative observer.
However, whereas Deweyan imaginative rehearsal relies on unguided, analog imagin-
ing, the player’s projective rehearsal is supported, directed, and enlivened by the game’s 
digital representations. Th e medium of the moral imagination becomes itself supportively 
mediated. In being so mediated, it is not necessarily constrained by such fi nite mental 
resources as working memory and the stock of representations internally available to the 
deliberator. Th e game can provide novel representations and hold massive quantities of 
representations in the hardware platform’s virtual “memory.” It can simulate thinking and 
feeling agents, who will be meaningfully impacted by the player’s choices and actions, and 
it can represent such agents as being embroiled in harrowing social dilemmas. Finally, it 
can render such moral concepts to the player through audiovisual interfacing that rivals 
or surpasses the fi delity of purely mental imagery. Indeed, Life Is Strange does all these 
things. Th e game’s representations enable it to make moral agency come alive to imme-
diate sensation, and, through sensation, to the moral imagination. Th is vital union of 
environing aesthetics with deliberative ethics is peculiarly Deweyan. Th rough its aesthetic 
realization, the ethical gameplay experience is focused, intensifi ed, and made personally 
meaningful. 
An egocentric, deliberational perspective on the ethics of video games is in vari-
ous ways anticipated by previous work in game studies and game design. I have already 
related it to work that conceives of video games as experiences of the self. Another illus-
trative parallel is to James Gee’s infl uential notion of projective identity, which denotes a 
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on two senses of the word “project” meaning both “to project one’s values and desires 
onto the virtual character” […] and “seeing the virtual character as one’s own project in 
the making, a creature whom I imbue with a certain trajectory through time defi ned by 
my aspirations for what I want that character to be and become” […] I will represent this 
identity as “James Paul Gee as [the fi ctional character of] Bead Bead.” (2003, pp. 55-56)
Th is imaginative process parallels the Deweyan deliberator’s rehearsals as described 
above. Th e player’s own values and agency are projected onto a fi ctional player-character, 
and, through that manifested self, into the hypothetical game world. Another Deweyan 
theme, thus far unmentioned, is that projective engagement represents not just a process 
of moral discovery and determination, but of moral self-discovery and self-determination: 
In my projective identity I worry about what sort of “person” I want her to be, what type of 
history I want her to have had by the time I am done playing the game. I want this person 
and history to refl ect my values, though I have to think refl ectively and critically about 
them. (ibid., p. 56) 
So, too, for the Deweyan deliberator: “Superfi cially, the deliberation which terminates in 
choice is concerned with weighing the values of particular ends. Below the surface, it is 
a process of discovering what sort of being a person most wants to become” (Dewey & 
Tuft, 1932, p. 317). In both cases, the moral imagination does not simply proceed from 
the existing moral self, but reveals and revises the moral self through its refl exive rehears-
als (see Consalvo et al., 2019). Th is perspective evokes the philosophy of Richard Kearney, 
who stresses that the moral imagination is not just allocentric—not just “responsive to 
the demands of the other”—but also “bids man to tell and retell the story of himself,” that 
is, to refl ect on and revise the moral self in response to the other (1988, p. 395).
Consider the standard gameplay mechanic of saving and loading your game. It is not 
uncommon for players to load a previous save state in a game when they believe their 
actions to have caused otherwise irreversible social harm. Understandably, such players 
wish to “walk back” their moral failings and proceed on a diff erent moral course. Th is 
operation can be procedurally mapped as movement on a branching decision tree. Th e 
player annuls a moral lapse by reverting to a previous node in the decision tree, and from 
there may reprise the game’s self-involving fi ction with greater moral awareness. Life Is 
Strange brings this approach to a head by encompassing the mechanic in the game’s 
fi ction: For reasons that are never made fully explicit, Max has the ability to reverse time 
and undo previous choices and actions. Players may probingly follow one course of action, 
experiencing in the process its dramatized career as well as their own emotional response 
to it, and then decide to accept the outcome or to “rewind” and try for a diff erent out-
come. Th is approach to gameplay is one of imaginatively and emotionally forecasting 
available moral courses, and in the process integrating new information that would have 
informed the player’s original choice, had it been known at the outset. Th e procedure 
parallels the workings of mental simulation in moral cognition. As Icard, Cushman, and 
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Knobe observe, “if the function of simulation is to improve future action then, broadly 
speaking, it must work by correcting errors in people’s current assumption about the 
values of various actions” (2018, p. 517). 
Of course, players may also wish not to be able to glibly revert their moral decisions, 
as this can be felt to sap the decisions’ meaningfulness at a more global level (Simkins & 
Steinkuehler, 2008, p. 348). Th erefore, rather than committing only to a single ethically 
meaningful action or decision before potentially reverting it, players may wish to commit 
to a complete ethical playthrough. Games like Life Is Strange are sometimes played in this 
way. I think the right way to analyze this approach is as imaginative simulation of a diff er-
ent order than is supported by the save-load approach. Whereas the save-load approach 
allows the player to rehearse and revert particular moral choices and actions, an uninter-
rupted playthrough allows the player to rehearse a full moral course, which may then be 
reverted in a subsequent playthrough, typically with a view to obtaining a morally pref-
erable outcome. Th at morally preferable outcome is commonly taken to supersede the 
morally inferior outcome that preceded it, even though both outcomes were actualized 
by the player’s actions. In other words, the morally superior outcome, once achieved, is 
what actually happened, whereas the morally inferior outcome is negated, or overwritten; 
it was merely a test-run. A similar perspective is betokened by players’ synonymous use of 
“true” and “good” to designate an especially desirable ending in video games that can end 
on diff erent notes, such as Undertale and Nier: Automata (developed by PlatinumGames, 
released 2017) (e.g., TV Tropes, 2019). Th e “true ending” of an ethically notable video 
game is typically the ending that satisfi es the player’s moral aspirations in a meritorious 
dénouement, thereby rewarding sustained moral investment. It is also the ending that the 
player would normally want and might replay the game to get. Th is teleological language 
echoes Dewey’s integration of aesthetic with moral modes of experience in its insistence 
that the aesthetic aim of unifi ed experience is contingent on some sort of moral closure. 
All of this is not to say that players will always aim for the most moral outcome pos-
sible. Th ey may also wish to explore vice in a virtual setting. Th is is no objection to the 
account that I am proposing, as it need not assume players to be paragons of virtual 
virtue since, quite uncontroversially, most people are not paragons of real-life virtue. 
Rather, we might expect players to at least sometimes be enticed to wrongdoing—even if 
only for purposes of moral experimentation (Simkins & Steinkuehler, 2008). Still, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that players of video games tend to act from considerations derived 
from their own moral values (Consalvo et al., 2019; Weaver & Lewis, 2012). Th ey tend to 
do the right thing as they see it, as presumably they tend to do in real life. 
Another potential concern with the present account might be how it would accom-
modate the distinction between projecting one’s own identity onto a player character 
versus adopting the fi ctionally pregiven characteristics of a player character, including that 
character’s moral outlook (e.g., Banks, 2015). Some players may favor one or the other 
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as by relating the character’s backstory in enough detail to establish certain core values 
and personality traits. However, both approaches imply that players adopt a fi rst-personal 
perspective on the game world, and both approaches allow players to experiment, in an 
involved and refl ective way, with moral choice and social consequence. In my view, the 
fact that players are sometimes able to adopt a diff erent identity only expands the scope 
of video gaming to provide egocentric moral experiences. 
Th e egocentric ethics of Undertale
To further illustrate how my approach can shed light on ethical gameplay, I will now apply 
it to the popular role-playing adventure game Undertale (independently developed and 
published by Toby Fox), which is widely recognized to be an ethically accomplished and 
challenging game. In Undertale, the player starts by naming the player character, a child 
whose personality has not been intimated and whose physical features are vague and 
androgynously ambiguous. Th e nondescript, “empty” nature of the player character sug-
gests that it is a mere vessel for the player’s projective engagement in Undertale’s fi ctional 
world. Th at world is initially presented as the world of a typical action-adventure video 
game, complete with a simple story of good, in the guise of humans, fi ghting evil, in the 
guise of monsters. Following a war with humanity, the monster king, Asgore, has been 
banished to the Underworld along with his minions. He plots to escape the Underworld 
and overthrow the humans. Players fi nd themselves in the Underworld by mere happen-
stance and must survive monster attacks and hazardous environments in order to defeat 
Asgore and return home. 
As the story world opens up, however, it becomes clear that things are not so simple. 
Th e frequently hostile inhabitants of the Underworld are not crazed killers, but think-
ing and feeling creatures with dreams and fears and whimsical personalities. Trained by 
genre convention, the player may well choose to kill and loot the monsters. However, the 
monsters may also be spared, which typically requires interacting with them in order to 
appease them, such as by probing their grievances and comforting them. As the inquisi-
tive player will soon discover, the monsters feel extremely threatened by the human 
player because of their historical oppression and banishment by the human species. Th ey 
have reasons to be hostile, and to assume hostility on part of the player character. In 
accordance with genre convention, players who choose to kill the monsters are rewarded 
with valuable experience points (EXP), which increase their level (LV) and thereby their 
power, as well as with currency that enables them to acquire helpful items and perks from 
non-hostile monsters. Players’ choices about how to deal with the game world’s inhabit-
ants will eventually lead to one of three main endings, which the player community has 
come to label Pacifi st, Neutral, and Genocide, respectively. Each label conveys the moral 
and emotional tone of its corresponding ending.
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Figure 1: Th e backstory of Undertale, related in the game’s opening cutscene, suggests a 
morally clear-cut confl ict between righteous humans and evil monsters. 
Source: author’s screenshot.
Undertale presents a whole story world of characters and character relationships, and 
of moral choice and moral consequence. However, Undertale initially hides this richness 
behind its crude graphical presentation. Th e game’s simple yet expressive sprite-based 
aesthetic and isometric perspective harken back to the 8- and 16-bit role-playing games 
of the 1980s and 1990s, such as those in the Dragon Quest (1986–) and Final Fantasy 
(1987–) series. Th ese games, which almost all revolved around powering up the player 
character in order to vanquish some evil menace, contained no serious moral diffi  culties. 
Th ey had good characters to help and bad characters to kill. In channeling this tradition, 
Undertale plays on a conditioned expectation that a lack of graphical texture betrays a 
lack of moral content. But as already mentioned, the “monsters” of the Underworld are 
endearing social creatures that live, love, and squabble, much like their human oppressors. 
Some are genuinely nasty, just as some people are nasty. Many are endearing and funny. If 
the player kills a monster, others may be seriously and lastingly impacted, and witnessing 
these consequences may cause players to reconsider their approach.
For example, if the player kills the motherly cow-monster Toriel, a dear friend of Toriel 
will unwittingly comment that he has been unable to contact her near the end of the 
game. Unbeknownst to him, of course, he is never going to see her again. Th e player’s 
realization of this fact is likely to make them feel guilty—so guilty that they might choose 
to revert to a previous save state in order to spare Toriel’s life. Players who do reload after 
killing Toriel are soon after greeted with knowing derision by the game’s true antagonist, 
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know what you did. You murdered her. And then you went back, because you regretted 
it. Ha ha ha ha…” In recognizing the player’s fi nal accountability in this way, Undertale 
might be seen to discount or ridicule the save-reload mentality described above. How-
ever, in also recognizing the player’s guilt as precisely the sort of moral motive that would 
induce the player to “[go] back,” Undertale affi  rms that mentality as descriptively true of 
players. In other words, Flowey’s metafi ctional remarks presuppose the player’s delibera-
tive engagement with the game’s fi ctional world.
If, throughout Undertale, the player kills many monsters, a whole monster town may 
be deserted by the time the player arrives there, likely because the town’s former inhabit-
ants feared becoming the hostile intruder’s next target. Such consequences of the player’s 
actions are morally signifi cant in their being about the player’s social imprint on the 
game’s fi ctional world. Players come to discover these consequences, as well as such per-
sonal consequentiality as will be reported by attendant emotion, and to integrate them 
in a broader view of the game’s ethical import. Consider the testimony of one player, as 
recorded in his popular YouTube video “Good Game Design – Undertale: Real Morality”:
Th e fi rst time I played […] I just killed everything I came across […] I did this because 
that’s just how I’ve always played RPGs [role-playing games]. You have to kill the bosses 
and enemies you face, right? I mean, sure, the game told me that you can talk to them or 
do diff erent actions, but I basically stuck to what I knew, because it was the comfortable 
solution. But what I noticed almost immediately is how much this game makes you feel 
bad for killing things: from Toriel’s heart shattering into a million pieces, to Muff et’s little 
baby spider laying a fl ower on her grave, to Undyne melting away as she tries to cling to 
life. It made me rethink every action I was doing and if it was really the right decision at all. 
(Snoman Gaming, 2015)
My own initial playthrough of Undertale led to a similar shift in perspective. I subse-
quently came to adopt a more morally responsive, “Pacifi st” playstyle, which revealed 
the true extent of the monsters’ grim predicament. Crucially, this revelation was brought 
about by my own exploratory eff orts, which, in turn, were prompted by my sensing that 
Undertale had more to off er than I had previously assumed. Th is epistemic function 
marks another parallel between the Deweyan moral imagination and video gameplay: 
Both are testingly inquisitive in nature. Just as one may mentally rehearse a moral scenario 
in order to appreciate its scope and complexity, so the player explores, maps, and probes 
the worlds of games like Undertale. To the extent that such games are ethically ambitious, 
they will challenge the player to perceive and engage the game world’s ethical aff ordances 
and thus attain a fuller picture of the meaning of the game.
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Figure 2: Harkening back to earlier generations of role-playing games, the graphics of 
Undertale are simple but expressive. 
Source: author’s screenshot.
Th roughout Undertale, the player occasionally interacts with an enigmatic and playful 
skeleton monster named Sans (the same character that may comment on Toriel’s disap-
pearance). Th ough he appears as a fi ctional character, Sans, like Flowey, frequently inti-
mates an awareness of the actual player of the game. After cracking a joke, he may turn 
toward the virtual camera and wink directly at the player, and, if the game’s software 
code has been tampered with, he may address who could only be the player as a “dirty 
hacker.” (Curiously, Sans’s switch from addressing the player character to directly address-
ing the player goes unmarked in Undertale. Th ere is no functional equivalent of the “Dear 
reader” trope. I take it that the direct address is sanctioned by the game fi ction’s self-
involving nature.)
Toward the end of Undertale, right before the player’s fi nal confrontation with King 
Asgore, Sans appears in front of the player character to “judge” them for their actions 
throughout the game. During this judgment, Sans reveals that the EXP and LV that the 
player has attained, which assumedly stood for Experience Points and Level, as in count-
less other games, are actually short for Execution Points and Level of Violence. In com-
menting on these extradiegetic interface elements, Sans quite clearly means to suggest 
something about the player rather than about the fi ctional player character. Sans further 
observes that the player’s LV at this point in the game is a direct measure of the amount 
of suff ering they have caused in the game world. Depending on how much hardship the 
monsters have endured at the player’s hands, Sans may go as far as to accuse the player of 
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them without warning and with immense power. It is diffi  cult to convey the impact of 
this sequence in plain text without making it seem somewhat on the nose. In the context 
of a structurally traditional roleplaying game, however, it is anything but. Th e player’s 
moral shock is a product of understandable but limiting assumptions about the kinds of 
themes and inspirations a game like Undertale may contain. Undertale’s interactive fi ction 
challenges the player to discard such limiting assumptions, and to reckon with their own 
deliberative involvement in the game’s virtual world.
Th e observations just made about Undertale were intended to surface themes and 
experiences found in other ethically notable video games as well. Such games challenge 
players to appreciate their personal involvement in sociomoral complexity before com-
mitting, however testingly, to a morally responsive course of action. For example, in the 
provocative indie-release Papers, Please (developed by Lucas Pope and 3909 LLC, released 
2013), players take on the role of an immigration offi  cer in the fi ctitious, Eastern Bloc-
inspired nation of Arstotzka. Th e rules of the game are simple: Over the course of 31 in-
game days, players must review the papers of hundreds of would-be immigrants and deny 
anyone who presents exclusionary, insuffi  cient, invalid, or false information. However, 
moral complexity is introduced as players are forced to decide whether to break the rules 
for some moral purpose, such as to admit refugees whose lives may be threatened or to 
prevent the splitting up of nuclear families. It can sometimes be diffi  cult to determine 
if the applicants are lying about their plight and engaged in dangerous schemes of their 
own, such as human traffi  cking. Moreover, players must constantly contend with a social 
double bind: If they fail to observe the immigration rules, they may be fi ned heavily and 
could therefore end up unable to provide food and medicine for their own impoverished 
families. 
All of this adds up to a game in which agonizing moral compromise is inevitable. At 
fi rst, the player is likely to approach the game in an unrefl ective and mechanistic way. 
Documents are checked, information cross-referenced, and a decision is made. But blind 
rule-following fails to capture what is most interesting about Papers, Please, and the 
inquisitive player will soon fi nd the game’s true challenge to be decidedly unmechanistic. 
Th at challenge is one of appreciating the expansive moral scope of one’s role as an immi-
gration offi  cer, and, subsequently, of making very hard choices. Moreover, the game’s 
menu, which lists a separate, playable timeline for each of the player’s prior game sessions, 
allows the player to resume any of these sessions at will. Th e player even decides on which 
date to resume the session, and is thus free to entertain and compare multiple moral 
trajectories. To repeat, this schema recalls processes of unmediated moral deliberation, 
which also proceeds through diff erent possible courses of action from the recognition of 
goals beset by moral diffi  culty.
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Conclusion
Anticipating the conclusions of this article, Henry Jenkins has observed that 
the computer game constitutes an incredible resource for self-refl ection and personal 
exploration, one with rich potentials for moral and ethical education. No other current art 
form allows such an intense focus on choices and their consequences; no other art form 
allows us this same degree of agency to make our own decisions and then live through 
their outcomes. (2010, p.xvi) 
I have argued that video games may so furnish the moral imagination by scaff olding the 
player’s fi rst-personal imaginative rehearsal in an aesthetically realized virtual setting. In 
this fi nal section, I briefl y relate this perspective to existing work on the ethics of video 
games. 
Of the diff erent ethical frameworks that have been applied to video games, virtue 
ethics has arguably been the most productive (e.g., McCormick, 2001; Sicart, 2009). In 
a sentence, a virtue ethics of video gaming sees the player’s moral agency in the game 
world as originating from, and redounding to, the moral character of that player. Games 
may therefore be ethically evaluated on the extent to which they foster gameplay experi-
ences that may be thought negatively or positively to infl uence the moral character of the 
player. Numerous considerations recommend this perspective (McCormick, 2001). Most 
obviously, the virtue ethical perspective locates the ultimate source of video gaming’s 
moral signifi cance in the player rather than in the fi ctional consequences of the player’s 
agency. Th is is a reasonable starting point given that players exist as thinking and feeling 
beings whereas fi ctional video game characters do not. However, a virtue ethics of video 
gaming is in an important (if only descriptive) sense derivative. It is derivative because 
video games could only probe and aff ect moral character by way of supporting morally 
relevant forms of experience. Th e medium can accomplish this by allowing players delib-
eratively to simulate moral choice and action.
I believe that this move—to conceive of ethical video gameplay in the terms of actual, 
albeit imaginative and fi ctional, experience—is an important one. It suggests a rather 
close structural fi t between the ethics of video gaming and the ethics of unmediated 
experience. On this view, if we wish to understand the kinds of moral experience open 
to video games, we should look to the kinds of moral experience found in real life. Th is is 
a departure from the more formalized account of Sicart, who argues that there are “two 
fundamental elements to [video games]: systems and worlds. Th ese two elements have 
to be coherent, creating entertaining gameplay while crafting a game world. Th e ethics 
of games as designed objects can be found in the relations between these two elements” 
(2009, pp. 21-22). Sicart is surely right that video games comprise these two distinct ele-
ments, or bases, but their mutual interaction may not be the proper level of analysis of 
the player’s ethical experience. As Grodal (2000, p. 203) points out, the player typically 
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ing events in which they imaginatively participate—rather than as an abstract system. 
Th erefore, the proper level of analysis of the player’s fi rst-personal moral experience may 
typically be that of making choices and taking action in a social environment. One way to 
substantiate this argument would be to document similarities in how players discuss their 
real and virtual ethical agency. If, in both cases, players talk intuitively of being a social 
agent in a world of other social agents—of having to choose between diff erent moral 
and nonmoral ends, and of anticipating or failing to anticipate the consequences of such 
choices—then that would be evidence that players’ mediated ethical experience is struc-
turally similar to their unmediated ethical experience, and that it ought to be analyzed as 
such (see Mosca, 2017, for discussion). For what it is worth, my own experience has been 
that players do talk in this way.
Another point of contact with real-world morality comes from the suggestion that 
the playing of ethically notable video games constitutes a form of imaginative rehearsal 
(see also Zagal, 2009). If so, might we not expect this rehearsal to cultivate socially respon-
sive action in the real world? Existing research on the possible moral benefi ts of video 
gameplay has focused on games with an explicitly prosocial message. Such games have 
been found to cause positive but quite limited eff ects on player attitudes and behaviors 
(Greitemeyer & Mügge, 2014). From a Deweyan perspective, however, it might be more 
productive to study how players respond to morally challenging gameplay—gameplay 
that challenges them to question easy assumptions and make hard choices. 
As a fi nal thought, I believe that an appreciation of the egocentric ethics of video 
games may contribute to the medium’s artistic enfranchisement. To use Janet Murray’s 
(2016) terminology, the modern video game is more than just an “additive” medium—
more than video plus game (ch. 3). It is a medium that, unlike literature and fi lm, involves 
the media user centrally in its elaborate fi ctional worlds. From an ethical perspective, this 
pervasive egocentricity is what makes the medium special, and, to my mind, tremen-
dously exciting. It may be what allows us to conclude that video games are an ethically 
signifi cant art form.
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